

## DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 468 271

UD 034 860

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TITLE Does School District Takeover Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of City and State Takeover as a School Reform Strategy.  
SPONS AGENCY Mid-Atlantic Lab. for Student Success, Philadelphia, PA.; Department of Education, Washington, DC.  
PUB DATE 2001-08-00  
NOTE 34p.; Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco, CA, August 30-September 2, 2001).  
AVAILABLE FROM For full text: <http://dlo.peabody.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/wong.htm>.  
PUB TYPE Reports - Evaluative (142) -- Speeches/Meeting Papers (150)  
EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.  
DESCRIPTORS \*Academic Achievement; Accountability; \*Educational Change; Educational Improvement; Elementary Secondary Education; \*Low Achievement; \*School Districts; Scores; \*Urban Schools  
IDENTIFIERS \*Reform Efforts; \*State Takeovers

## ABSTRACT

This study examines the potential for city and state takeovers to turn around low performing schools, utilizing diverse empirical measures to gauge the initial impact of city/state school district takeover reform in four districts. Data come from the U.S. Department of Education, Bureau of Labor Statistics, state departments of education, local districts, and other sources and focus on socioeconomic/demographics, politics/partnerships, school quality, and student achievement. Section one introduces the issue. Section two describes the research design. Section three employs a national, multi-level database to empirically analyze takeover reform. In the U.S., takeovers on the district level have produced modest and sometimes mixed achievement gains. Evidence suggests that mayoral takeovers are improving the lowest performing schools and may lead to the infusion of non-teacher administrators to management and increased fiscal responsibility. There are mixed results for state takeovers on both academic and management issues. Both city and state takeovers heavily emphasize academic accountability. Mayoral takeovers are more likely to utilize additional tests beyond state mandated tests. The study applies the integrated governance framework to examine variation in takeover effects in the case study districts. Ten tables are appended. (Contains 19 references and 10 tables.) (SM)

***Does School District Takeover Work?***  
**Assessing the Effectiveness of**  
**City and State Takeover**  
**as a School Reform Strategy**

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Prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30-September 2, 2001.

This research is supported in part by a grant from the Laboratory for Student Success at Temple University and a grant from the Field-Initiated Studies Program at the U.S. Department of Education.

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*Does School District Takeover Work?*  
**Assessing the Effectiveness of City and State Takeover as a School Reform Strategy**

An increasing number of states and cities are allowing for takeover of the school district, either by a state authority or by the mayor. Twenty-four states allow state takeover of local school districts, permitting state officials to exert authority over a district in the case of “academic bankruptcy” or woefully low-performing schools. School district takeovers have occurred in eighteen states and the District of Columbia.

In other states, school district takeover is becoming a high profile policy and political issue. In Missouri, for instance, state lawmakers are considering a bill that would allow for the immediate takeover of the Kansas City school district.<sup>1</sup> On the other side of the state, mayoral takeover of the school district became an important campaign issue in St. Louis. During the 2001 campaign for mayor, “five of the six St. Louis mayoral candidates [said] they wouldn’t hesitate to push for a takeover if the city’s schools lose their accreditation.” Eventual winner Francis Slay warned that although he doesn’t want to implement a takeover, “if partnership and cooperation don’t work, [he] won’t be afraid to take drastic action.”<sup>2</sup> Mayor Slay joins a growing number of state and city policymakers who are now turning to school district takeover as a reform strategy to improve failing public school systems. In light of the growing trend of city and state takeover of school districts, the key question for researchers to answer is, “Does school district takeover work?” This study is designed to answer that question.

This study examines the potential for city and state takeovers to turn around low performing schools. At issue is how effective a city/state takeover can be as a strategy to promote higher quality teaching and learning, improve management, and enhance public confidence. This study utilizes a diverse set of empirical measures to gauge the initial impact of city/state school

district takeover reform. We have created a new multi-level, integrated database to compare takeovers across districts. As additional states and cities consider takeover reform as a potential school reform option, it is important that they are aware of the effects that takeover reform has produced thus far in the states and cities that have already implemented it.

Like other major educational reforms, city/state takeover of a school district suggests both promises and limitations. On the one hand, the takeover strategy has the potential to turn around low performing communities. Takeover initiatives tend to hold schools and students accountable to system wide standards. To restore public trust, takeover reform maintains a strong focus on low performing schools and students, including allocating additional resources to those schools. Takeover reform also recruits non-traditional leaders to top management positions in order to change existing organizational practices and culture. On the other hand, takeover initiatives are viewed by professional educators as an infringement of their professional autonomy. Mayor – or state – appointed administrators may lack the expertise on instructional and curriculum issues. Too often, takeover reform pays primary attention to standardized test achievement as the most important measure of school improvement. There have also been questions raised about the role of race in determining the takeover of districts.<sup>3</sup>

Given these potential strengths and limitations of takeover reform, this study examines the effects on schooling outcomes in this reform initiative. Our new database is designed to empirically assess the effects of city/state takeovers across time and across districts. This is especially useful for analyzing complex reforms that are intended to produce not only financial, but also managerial and academic improvements. This study is the first attempt to date to empirically assess takeover reform at a national level, integrating into one study information on every existing case of city/state takeover. While individual states, cities, and districts produce

their own internal evaluations, these reports focus primarily on only one school district. These reports are useful for assessing a particular district, but comparative analysis across school districts is necessary to assess broader, national trends.

In focusing on the management and performance of takeover reform, this study contributes to the procedural knowledge of policymakers who are designing and implementing this strategy in different settings. In choosing a broad focus, this study also sets the stage for researchers to pursue our findings in more detail as additional data from takeover reform becomes available. Our study is intended to serve as an empirical back drop against which discussion of school district takeover can be further debated and discussed.

Our study is organized in four sections. **I.** We first present an introduction to school district takeover, noting the structural framework and emergence of takeover reform to address academic, management, and financial crises. **II.** We next describe our research design in examining the implementation and effectiveness of comprehensive city/state takeovers. **III.** We employ our national, multi-level database to perform empirical analysis of takeover reform. We find that nationwide at the district level, takeovers have produced modest and sometimes mixed achievement gains. Using school level analysis in Chicago and Boston, however, we find evidence to suggest that mayoral takeovers are indeed improving the lowest performing schools. We also find that mayoral takeovers may lead to the infusion of non-teacher administrators to management and to increased fiscal responsibility. We find mixed results for state takeovers on both academic and management issues. **IV.** We conclude with a discussion on improving accountability and its implications for policy and practice. We apply the integrated governance framework to examine the variation in takeover effectiveness in the fourteen case study districts. We discuss the broad implications of our findings for both researchers and policy reformers.

## I. Introduction

### *Structural Framework Allowing for School District Takeover*

City and state government takeover as a school reform model focuses on district-level capacity to reduce institutional fragmentation and raise academic accountability. This kind of system wide restructuring is based on several organizational principles that:

- recognize that the existing political structures are not easily alterable;
- empower the district and state level administration to intervene in failing schools;
- enable city hall to manage conflicting interests and reduce fragmentary rules; and
- integrate political accountability and educational performance standards at the system wide level (Wong, 1999; Wong 1992).

Recognizing these structural challenges, policy makers have adopted two diverse, innovative approaches to improve student performance, broadly labeled as “choice-based” and “integrated governance.” The choice-based strategy relies on parental preferences as the primary driving force to improve school performance. Examples of this innovation include charter schools and contractual arrangements, both of which may involve non-traditional service providers (Hill 1997; Chubb 1997). Choice-based reform values school autonomy and competition in a market-like environment. In contrast to choice, the integrated governance approach enables the mayor or state officials to rely on system wide standards to hold schools and students accountable for their performance. To improve outcome-based accountability, integrated governance often imposes sanctions on and provides support to low performing schools (Wong 1999). Failing students are no longer promoted to a higher grade but are required to attend summer instructional programs.

Indeed, integrated governance has gained national attention. The hallmark of the Bush Administration Education plan is to “Increase accountability for student performance” through a system in which “states, districts and schools that improve achievement will be rewarded [and] failure will be sanctioned.”<sup>4</sup> In light of the growing prominence of the choice-based and integrated governance approaches, school politics is likely to be shaped by the ways in which the current, largely insulated, school bureaucracy moves toward either one of the two models. This paper is concerned with the takeover aspects of the integrated governance school reform model.

### ***Emergence of School District Takeover***

A growing number of states and city governments have developed policies to deal with failing school districts or failing schools (Cibulka and Derlin 1998; O’ Day, 1997). Most states have had provisions for state takeover of local school districts, but states rarely invoked them, except in cases of clear financial mismanagement or illegal activity (Cibulka, 1999). Some of the more recent state takeover laws focus more on breaches of academic accountability. Twenty-four states allow state takeover of local school districts, permitting state officials to exert authority over a district in the case of “academic bankruptcy,” or woefully low-performing schools, but only eleven states have exercised the law. Even when intervening, states often refrain from entirely dismantling the local school district administration, such as the school board and the superintendent. A majority of state takeover laws allow state administrators to influence decisions behind the scenes in a more limited fashion in academically troubled districts, first giving schools or districts an opportunity to improve before more drastic measures are taken (Cibulka, 1999).

In Maryland, for instance, schools can be reconstituted if they have been falling below a certain standard of performance and have been declining in performance over several years.



Schools can develop a transition plan to avoid reconstitution by the state. State monitoring and some initial additional funds are provided until the school has improved sufficiently to warrant being taken off the list (none have been thus far). If a school fails to improve, the state reserves the right to reconstitute the school, including instituting management by an alternative provider (Cibulka, 1999; Michaels and Ferrara, 1999).

Implementation of takeover reform has increased over the past decade. **Table 1** details the incidences of takeovers over time and separates them according to the reason for takeover. Implementation of takeover policies has become more popular over time, with a peak of takeovers coming during the three-year period from 1995 to 1997. Thirty-eight percent (15 of 40) of takeovers occurred during these three years, including the highly publicized takeovers in Chicago (1995), Cleveland (1997), and Baltimore (1997).

Takeovers have also grown broader in scope over time (Table 1). While most states have had provisions for state takeover of local school districts, states rarely invoked them, except in cases of clear financial mismanagement or illegal activity (Cibulka, 1999). Before the 1995-97 takeover peak, 60% of takeovers were for purely financial and/or management reasons, while only 27% were comprehensive takeovers that included academics. In the three years after 1997, however, the percentage of comprehensive takeovers has risen to 67% and the percentage of takeovers solely for financial and/or management has dropped to 22%. The general trend, following on the heels of the big city takeovers in 1995-97, is for city/state takeovers to involve more than just financial management.

Consistent with the trend seen in Table 1, some of the more recent state takeover laws focus more on breaches of academic accountability. Even when intervening, states often refrain from entirely dismantling the local school district administration, such as the school board and

the superintendent. A majority of state takeover laws allow state administrators to influence decisions behind the scenes in a more limited fashion in academically troubled districts, first giving schools or districts an opportunity to improve before more drastic measures are taken (Cibulka, 1999). When takeovers do occur, the duration of the takeover is linked to its scope (Table 2). The overwhelming majority (10 of 14) of completed takeovers (where local control has been re-established) are takeovers that do not involve academic reform. Table 2 bears out the conclusion that state policymakers arrived at in 1997: "Improving student achievement takes time" (Lewis 1997). This is seen in the fact that only four of the twenty-three takeovers involving academics have been completed. The rest remain in progress, and may remain in progress for a long time. The comprehensive takeovers, which include financial, managerial, and academic components, last the longest. Only one of the comprehensive takeovers has been completed, and it is the oft cited state takeover of Logan County, West Virginia.<sup>5</sup> In that case, Ziebarth (2001), Bushweller (1998), and Seder (2000) all quote local officials who "credit the success of the takeover to working collaboratively with the local school board during the takeover" (Seder 2000). The remaining comprehensive takeovers are still in effect, and seven of the fourteen have been in place for more than five years. This study focuses on the effectiveness of the fourteen comprehensive takeovers still in progress.

### ***Research Base on Effectiveness of City/State Takeover as a Reform Strategy***

Research on the effectiveness of state takeover strategy is lagging behind the pace of policy and practice. In a Policy Brief for the Education Commission of the States (ECS), Todd Ziebarth writes that "there is a scarcity of research on the effects of state takeovers."<sup>6</sup> Most studies suggest that it is far easier to clean up district-level finances and management practices than it is to make a dent in student achievement.<sup>7</sup> One study of state takeovers emphasized that

successful districts should “align the local curriculum with state standards and tests.”<sup>8</sup> This study also suggested that low administrative turnover and open communication with the community are keys to improvement.

Other studies have found mixed results. A new study of the New Jersey takeover of Newark, for example, found that “while test scores have risen since the 1995 takeover, clearly defined priorities and effective leadership remain elusive.”<sup>9</sup> In 1999, when the state of New Jersey announced it would return local control to Jersey City ten years after taking over the city’s school district, David G. Sciarra of the Education Law Center, commented that, “What’s so tragic here is not the takeover but the fact that in ten years we know very little about what happened, what works, and what didn’t work. All you’re left with are anecdotes from different interest groups.”<sup>10</sup> This study begins to fill the empirical gap on the issue of school district takeover.

### ***Focus on Fourteen Comprehensive Takeovers***

We examine the fourteen school districts in which “comprehensive” takeovers are currently in place.<sup>11</sup> Comprehensive refer to those takeovers in which the city or state has assumed control for academic, financial, and management reasons. Our districts fall into two categories: eight city (mayoral) takeovers in Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Baltimore, Detroit, Washington DC, Oakland, and Harrisburg; and six state takeovers in Compton CA, Newark NJ, Jersey City NJ, Paterson NJ, Hartford CT, and Lawrence, MA. As described in Wong (2000), takeover reform looks different in each school district because each case of city and state takeover involves a unique set of political and educational institutions. But despite this variation, all takeover reform has at its core the a goal to turn around failing schools. Thus, in each of these fourteen districts, it is appropriate to assess the effectiveness of takeover reform.

## **II. Research Design**

### ***Assessing the Effectiveness of Takeover Reform***

As discussed in Section I, many states and cities have turned to school district takeover with the hope that it will improve performance. Whether or not the takeovers will make their promised improvements, however, is unknown. Since this phenomenon is relatively new and even the oldest takeovers are not that old, there is a general lack of systematic study on the changing relationship between mayors/state officials and the public schools. To address both the conceptual and empirical needs, we create a national database that includes information from two local policy systems (i.e. the school district and the city/state) that have traditionally been insulated from each other. In most big cities, the school district overlaps with the city in terms of the geographical boundary. Yet their affairs remain independent from each other and direct communication between the two is minimal.

### ***Hypothesized Effects of Takeover Reform***

Our empirical analysis is based on the integrated governance structure: mayoral and state takeovers are understood in relation to the current climate of outcome-based accountability. Faced with a public that demands an improved district, we predict that mayors and state administrators will attempt to enact changes that can be measured and serve as proof of school improvement. With increased power over the school system, we further expect that mayors and state officials can potentially improve the academic performance, financial/administrative management, and public image of the school district. Finally, the “takeover rhetoric” from mayors and states officials suggests that school district takeovers place special emphasis on improving the lowest performing schools. Aggressive school takeovers (e.g. reconstitution) within larger district takeovers illustrate the desire of leadership to turn around failing schools.

Given these hypotheses about the potential effects of district takeover, we create a data set designed to address three key potential effects from state takeover:

1. Higher quality teacher and student performance, especially in the lowest performing schools
2. More effective financial and administrative management
3. Increased accountability in order to improve public perception of the school district

Evaluating the effectiveness of takeover reform in each of these areas involves two types of questions. First, is there evidence to suggest that takeover reform has produced positive results in each of these three areas? Second, if some takeovers are proving successful and other are not, what are the differences between successful takeover implementation and takeover reform that proves ineffective? In this study we focus on the first question, drawing on a diverse set of measurements to empirically assess the outcomes of city/state takeover reform.<sup>12</sup>

#### ***Data Sources and Analytical Methods***

Using publicly available data from the U.S. Department of Education, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, state Departments of Education, local school districts, and a variety of other sources, we gathered data in five key areas: socioeconomic/demographic, politics/partisanship, management/resource organization/arrangement of services, school quality, and student achievement.

Our analytical method consists of compiling and synthesizing data from across districts, as well as examining several school districts in greater detail. To study the effect of school district takeover on student achievement, we examine student achievement at both the district level and school level. At the district level, we considered recent trends in student performance on state and district administered standardized tests. To further investigate the relationship

between takeover reform and academic performance, we turn to school level analysis. This study focuses on four districts: Boston, MA, Chicago, IL, Lawrence, MA, and Compton, CA. We choose Chicago and Boston because they are the longest running and most extensive mayoral takeover programs. We choose Lawrence and Compton because they compare and contrast each other well. Compton was taken over by California state authorities in 1993, while Massachusetts state officials have only been involved in Lawrence over the past few years. In both cities, however, there has been much political fighting between local and state authorities.<sup>13</sup> Further, in September 2000 the state of California announced plans to gradually return control of the Compton Unified District to local authorities. This creates another interesting contrast, as Compton is headed toward the end of its state takeover and Lawrence is just beginning the implementation.

In each of these four districts, we gathered test score data and examined the change in the lowest performing schools relative to the overall district change.<sup>14</sup> In Boston we analyze the change in test scores on the new Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS). This test, which places an emphasis on state standards in English, Math, and Science, was first given in 1997-98 and then again in 1998-99. All fourth, eighth, and tenth graders in the Boston Public Schools took the test. Although it does not give a “pre-takeover” and “post-takeover” view of the Boston Public Schools, it does serve to reflect the current state of learning in the system. In Lawrence, which also uses the MCAS to assess its students, we make the same comparisons. 1998 and 1999 were tumultuous years in the Lawrence school district. Using the 1998-99 test score data looks at the results produced as a result of this unsettling environment.

In Chicago, we look at elementary school performance on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) and high school performance on the Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP). Since

these tests have been administered for many years in Chicago, we are able to make two comparisons over time. First, we compare the change in test scores from 1993-94 to 1996-97. This is a comparison of roughly two years before and after Mayor Daley's 1995 takeover. We then compare the test scores from 1996-97 to scores in 1998-99 to look at more recent trends in student performance. In Compton, we use data from the Stanford 9 exam, administered annually as part of California's Standardized Testing And Reporting (STAR) program. In Compton we looked at changes from 1997-98 to 1999-2000.

In addition to improvements in student achievement, takeovers also focus on improved management and fiscal responsibility. Using data from the Department of Education, we examine changes in per pupil expenditures (adjusted for inflation) and the distribution of administrative and support staff. We look at these two measures of resource allocation over time to see how they change (or remain constant) in reaction to mayoral or state takeover.<sup>15</sup>

We also examined trends in staffing distributions. Using NCES data, we developed two measurements of non-teacher resource allocation. We created a measurement of "Percent Non-teacher Administration" and "Percent Non-teacher Support."<sup>16</sup> These measurements represent the percent of all non-teacher employees who are being utilized in either administrative or support roles. We focus on these two indicators to see if mayoral and/or state takeover creates a new management structure.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, we focus on accountability in order to gauge public confidence in the school district. To assess the level of accountability, we use as a proxy the nature and frequency of standardized tests administered per year. Our assumption is that in order for public perception to become more positive, a school district must become more accountable to its constituency. Although not sufficient in itself, we believe strong accountability to the public is a necessary

condition. Further, we assume that standardized testing serves as a good proxy for estimating the a district's level of accountability.

Our assumptions are strengthened by a recent parent survey conducted by Public Agenda.<sup>18</sup> The survey focused on parental reaction to standardized tests and stronger academic standards, gathering responses from parents nationwide. They also gathered sample information in three of our case study cities (Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland,) as well as Los Angeles and New York. Responses in our case study cities indicate that there is a strong relationship between accountability (in the form of content standards and standardized tests) and parental perception of the school district.

In the survey parents were asked: "Requiring schools to publicize their standardized test scores is a wake-up call and a good way to hold schools accountable. Do you agree or disagree?" Parents could choose from four options: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strong disagree. In Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland, parents overwhelmingly agreed that tests scores are a good way to hold schools accountable. In Boston, 80% of parents agreed (with 57% strongly agreeing), in Chicago, 78% agreed (with 52% strongly agreeing), and in Cleveland, 76% agreed (with 56% strongly agreeing.) All three case study cities had a greater percentage of parents strongly agreeing with the question than the national average of 49%. The Public Agenda survey thus supports our assumption that parental (and thus public) perception of districts is tied to standardized test performance.

### **III. Empirical Analysis and Results**

We now report results from our analysis of mayoral and state takeovers. We examine the three key potential effects that takeovers are designed to produce: 1. Higher quality teacher and student performance, especially in the lowest performing schools; 2. More effective financial and



administrative management; and 3. Improved public perception of the school district through greater accountability.

### ***Higher quality teacher and student performance***

Aggregated to the district level, it is difficult to make generalizations about whether takeover reform is working as a means to improve student achievement (Table 3). On one hand, there are many examples of improvement in student performance after both city and state takeovers. On the other hand, however, there are also many counter-examples of recent decline. In Cleveland, for example, from 1998-99 to 1999-00 there were improvements in reading proficiency in grades 1, 3, and 5, but at the same time declines in grades 2, 4, 7, 8, and 10. Cleveland also saw gains in math in grades 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9 during the same period in which grade 11 declined.

Our findings from school level analysis in Boston, Chicago, Lawrence, and Compton lead to four broad conclusions regarding the relationship between academic performance and school district takeover. **First**, mayoral takeover is linked to increases in student achievement at the elementary grades. **Second**, gains in achievement are especially large for the lowest performing schools, suggesting that mayoral takeovers involve a special focus on these failing schools. **Third**, mayoral takeover seems less effective for the upper grades, where the cumulative effects of many years of poor schooling are not easily reversible. **Fourth**, when state takeovers produce administrative and political turmoil, student achievement suffers. After a period of adjustment, however, state takeovers may also be able to produce positive achievement gains.

#### *Mayoral takeover is linked to increases in student achievement at the elementary grades*

In Boston and Chicago, elementary schools are improving their standardized test scores. In Boston, the percent of students failing the MCAS fell in all three grades (4<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup>) for

both English and Math (Table 4). In Chicago, the percent of students at or above national norms on the ITBS/TAP in all but one grade level from 1994 to 1997, and across the board from 1997 to 1999. In 1999, this meant that the percent of students at national norms was 9% higher in math and 6.6% higher in reading than it was in 1997 (Table 5).

*Gains in achievement are especially large for the lowest performing schools*

In Boston and Chicago, the lowest performing elementary schools are making strong improvements as well. Compared to all schools in Boston, the lowest performing schools reduced the number of failing fourth grade students by almost 10% more in English (-17.95% for bottom 20% vs. -7.99% for all schools) and almost 5% in Math (-17.58% for bottom 20% vs. -12.87% for all schools).<sup>19</sup> In Chicago, the bottom 20% of elementary schools made greater improvements in all grades in both time intervals. Looking, for example, at fourth grade performance, Chicago's bottom 20% of schools bettered the average for all schools by 5% in Reading (16.1% for bottom 20% vs. 10.9% for all schools) and by almost 7% in Math (19.4% for bottom 20% vs. 12.5% for all schools). Our school level analysis strongly suggests that in these two mayoral takeover cities, the lowest performing elementary schools are making gains on their standardized test scores.

*Mayoral takeover seems less effective for the upper grades*

Achievement levels in the upper grades in both Boston and Chicago raise the possibility that in the upper grades, student achievement has not improved as much and the bottom 20% of schools have not performed better than the district average. In Boston, the percent of students (across all schools) failing the MCAS English section fell 7.99% for fourth graders, 5.36% for eighth graders, and 1.61% for tenth graders. In Math, the percent failing fell 12.87% for fourth graders, 9.08% for eighth graders, and 2.06% for tenth graders. This trend in student performance

suggests that the greatest gains in student achievement are realized in the lower grades. When we look at the percent of proficient students, we see a similar trend. In grade 10 in Boston, in fact, the percent of students proficient in English falls .61% from 97-98 to 98-99. In addition, we find that the bottom 20% of schools no longer perform better than the average for all schools. Compared to the .61% fall in proficiency in grade 10 English, for example, in the bottom 20% of Boston's high schools, tenth grade saw a 1.5% drop in proficiency. In Math, the average for all schools went up almost 2%, but the lowest performing schools made no improvement from the previous year. This is an example of the district average being driven by the higher performing schools, while the bottom 20% remain stagnant.

In Chicago, the same phenomenon arose in grade 9. From 1993-94 to 1996-97, the average for all schools went up 10.3% in math and 2.9% in English; the average for the bottom 20% of schools only rose 5.8% in math and 1.4% in English. In grade 11 in Chicago, the bottom 20% of schools performed about the same as the average for all schools, performing slightly worse in math and better in reading. From 1996-97 to 1998-99, the lowest performing schools did a little better in comparison with the overall average. In grade 9, their rate of improvement was almost identical to the overall average, and in grade 11, they performed 1.7% better in math and .9% better in English. The data we analyze for Boston and Chicago suggests that in the upper grades, the improvement in student achievement lessens overall and the lowest performing schools no longer improve more than the average for all schools.

*When state takeovers produce administrative and political turmoil, student achievement suffers*

In the state takeover district of Lawrence, MA, we find that between 1997-98 and 1998-99 there was little improvement overall on the MCAS (Table 6). Averaging across all grades and

all schools, the percent of students proficient or above on the MCAS fell .7% in English and .9% in Math. In addition, every grade saw an increased rate of failure in both English and Math.

Analysis of the lowest performing schools suggest that the lowest performing schools may be improving modestly amidst the larger district failures (Table 6). In eighth grade, for instance, the bottom two schools improved their proficiency rate in both subject areas while the overall eighth grade average declined. But because Lawrence has a small number of public schools, the “bottom 20%” lowest performing schools included only 2 (of 7) schools at the eighth grade level and 4 (of 13) at the fourth grade level. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that the primary result from the Lawrence achievement data is that during a period of superintendent turnover and state-city squabbling, student achievement declined.

*After a period of adjustment state takeovers may also be able to produce positive achievement gains*

In Compton, where state takeover has been in place since 1993, we find that students are improving their academic performance and the lowest performing schools are in most cases improving as well. From 1997-98 to 1999-00, all grade levels in the Compton Unified School District saw improvements on the Stanford 9 test (Table 7). Similar to Boston and Chicago, the largest gains were in grades 2 and 3, where reading scores went up 12.8% and 6.7% respectively. Math scores also rose. The bottom 20% of schools in Compton improved, and sometimes more than the average for all Compton schools. When considered next to the failures in Lawrence, the gains seen in Compton suggest that state intervention may be more effective after it has been established for a prolonged period of time. This would be consistent with the idea that after an adjustment phase, state takeover can establish effective strategies for improving achievement.

***More effective financial and administrative management***

When we consider the change in per pupil expenditures (PPE) in those cities where takeover has occurred, our data suggest that resource reallocation follows mayoral control. In Chicago, current PPE fell from \$6,389 in 1994-95 to \$6,179 in 1995-96, and then fell again to \$5,784 in 1996-97 (Table 8). In Boston, after takeover in 1992, current PPE fell from 1.3% from 1991-92 to 1992-93. This is the only decrease in PPE in Boston over the time interval we study (1992-97). After the initial decline in PPE, it may be that the public begins to approve of the Mayor's reform actions and therefore allow for greater spending. The Chicago data also suggests a reversal of allocative decision on instructional activities. By 1996-97, the Chicago percent of current expenditures spent on instruction (64.1%) was the highest in the last seven years. Finally, state takeover in Compton may also have instituted fiscal discipline. The largest decline in PPE occurred between the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years, after state takeover in 1993. Further, since state takeover current PPE has continued to decline every year. Compton also has the lowest per student spending among all the takeover districts we studied.

Analysis of the distribution of administrative and support personnel also suggests a new trend after mayoral takeover: the infusion of non-teacher administrators to management. This change was most evident in Chicago, where the percent of administrators rose significantly from 1995-96 to 1996-97 (Table 8). This was matched by a drop in the percent of support staff. These changes were greater than 30% and suggest that a more diversified management team is being put in place to run the school district, e.g. Chicago's recruited a former city budget director, Paul Vallas, to act as CEO and during the first six years of its takeover reform. In Chicago more employees are being recruited from the private and non-profit sector. The change in staffing distribution indicates that these new employees are being recruited to manage the district. Baltimore also had consistently greater percentages of administrators than most other takeover

districts, a possible indication of a more diversified management team. In the other mayoral and state takeover districts, evidence of change in management structure was less conclusive. Given our finding in Chicago after mayoral takeover, it will be interesting to see new data from Detroit, Cleveland, and other high-profile mayoral takeover districts. Our analysis suggests that we will see more administrative staff recruited from non-educational sectors.

### ***Increased Accountability In Order To Enhance Public Confidence***

Looking at the types of tests that districts give to their students, two trends are evident. First, all of our takeover districts are in states that administer content-standards assessments (Table 10). Although the states vary in the number of grades they test, it is clear that all of the states in which takeovers have occurred are concerned with measuring student performance against state-defined standards. Our second finding, however, is that in the mayoral takeover districts, there is also a strong emphasis placed on additional tests administered by the local authorities. In Chicago, for instance, the district created its own “Chicago Academic Standards Examination” (CASE) in order to better test its high school students. Chicago also uses the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) to further monitor its progress. In Detroit, the Metropolitan Achievement Test is used in addition to the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP). Baltimore employs the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) and Boston uses the Stanford 9 (SAT-9).

The use of these additional measures of evaluation in the mayoral takeover cities suggests that state standards are not the only benchmark districts are concerned about meeting. Because they use more than one set of standardized tests, the mayoral takeover districts test their students more than state takeover districts do. When we summed the number of tests administered over grades K-12, mayoral takeover districts offer administer an average of 19.29 tests, while state

takeover districts administer only 16.67 per year.<sup>20</sup> In the state takeover districts, the smaller number of standardized tests is consistent with the hypothesis that for state takeovers, state administered tests are most important for district evaluation.

#### **IV. Improving accountability: Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research**

Our analysis of city and state takeovers suggests the following conclusions. First, there are significant differences between mayoral takeover and state takeovers, and mayoral takeovers appear to be more productive in terms of academic improvement. Mayoral takeovers may make a significant impact on the lowest performing schools. Second, takeovers may also produce more efficient financial and administrative management, and in the case of mayoral takeover lead to a broadening of management expertise. Third, both city and state takeovers bring with them a heavy emphasis on academic accountability, and mayoral takeovers are more likely to utilize additional tests beyond state mandated exams.

While it is still too early to know where takeovers will lead (whether to sustained improvement or falling back), the components for success include: clear and attainable goals, working together with the existing administration for a smooth transition, and making the takeover heads (i.e. mayor) accountable as well as the teachers, students, etc. When this happens, our findings offer preliminary evidence that support mayoral takeovers as a reform that can improve failing school districts. Our findings also suggest that where there is political or administrative turmoil, school districts will not see as much improvement.

From a research perspective, the emergence of school district takeover within the integrated governance framework calls for more systematic studies that link district level reform to the school and classroom. What arrangement of integrated governance (i.e. mayoral, state, or some combination) takeover is most effective in improving learning opportunities in the most

disadvantaged, inner city schools? Will the new vision of accountability improve teaching practices? Can the mayor sustain his/her commitment to education in a system of competing constituencies? As school district takeover becomes more frequent, these are the sorts of questions that policy analysts must continue to address.



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## Appendix

**Table 1. Number of city/state takeovers, by type, 1988-2000**

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	Total
Financial only	1			2	1		1	1	5	2		1	1	15
Financial & Management		2			1		1							4
Academic only												1		1
Academic & Financial						1	1	1	1					4
Academic & Management								1						1
Comprehensive		2		1	1			3		2	2	1	3	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>40</b>

**NOTES FOR TABLE 1:** Classification based on data reported by Ziebarth (2001). Takeovers were only counted at the point of initial state involvement. (For example, the PA state takeover of the Chester-Upland School District is counted once, in 1994 when the district was taken over for financial reasons, even though in 2000 a new panel was created to further oversee the district.) "Comprehensive Takeover" refers to those cases in which the takeover occurred for a "variety of reasons," encompassing financial, academic, and managerial issues.

**Table 2. Duration of city/state takeovers, by type, 1988-2000**

	<i>Takeover Still In Effect</i>						<i>Takeover Complete – Return to Local Control</i>					
	1 yr	2 yrs	3 yrs	4 yrs	5+ yrs	Total	1 yr	2 yrs	3 yrs	4 yrs	5+ yrs	Total
Financial only	2			1	3	6	4	2		1		7
Financial & Management			1			1	1		1	1		3
Academic only	1		2			3						0
Academic & Financial					1	1		2			1	3
Academic & Management					1	1						0
Comprehensive	3	2	2		7	14				1		1
<b>Totals</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>14</b>

**NOTES FOR TABLE 2:** Classification based on data reported by Ziebarth (2001). In several cases, school districts were taken over, returned to local control, then taken over again. In these several cases, the takeovers were counted only once (at the time of initial takeover.) Takeovers scheduled to start in 2000 were not included since they have not yet completed at least one complete academic year. "Comprehensive Takeover" refers to those cases in which the takeover occurred for a "variety of reasons," i.e. financial, academic, and managerial issues.

**Table 3. Selected Highlights of Mayoral and State Takeover Districts' Recent Changes in Achievement on Standardized Tests**

	<i>Standardized Tests Analyzed</i>	<i>Evidence to Suggest Improvement</i>	<i>Evidence to Suggest Stagnation or Decline</i>
<b>Mayoral Control (Year of Reform)</b>			
Boston, MA (1992)	Stanford 9; Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)	From 96-97 to 97-98, almost all-grade levels improved on Stanford 9, and largest gains were at high school level; Reduced percent failing MCAS in all grade levels tested for reading and math in 99-00	1996-97 Stanford 9 results indicate a growing inequality in achievement by race; Also, less than 50% of high schoolers were proficient on the 96-97 Stanford 9
Chicago, IL (1995)	Illinois Goal Assessment	From 96-97 to 97-98,	From 98-99 to 99-00, 11 <sup>th</sup>

	<i>Standardized Tests Analyzed</i>	<i>Evidence to Suggest Improvement</i>	<i>Evidence to Suggest Stagnation or Decline</i>
	Program (IGAP); Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS); Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP)	improvement in 16 of 18 subject areas on IGAP; From 96-97 to 97-98, 3 <sup>rd</sup> and 6 <sup>th</sup> graders improved ITBS in both math and reading	graders at proficient or above on TAP fell 12.4% in reading and 7.9% in math
Cleveland, OH (1998)	Ohio State Proficiency Test	From 98-99 to 99-00, improvements in proficiency for reading in grades 1,3,5; for math in grades 1,3,5,6,7,9	From 98-99 to 99-00, decline in proficiency for reading in grades 2,4,7,8,10; for math in grade 11
Detroit, MI (1999)	Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP)	From 97-98 to 98-99, 7 <sup>th</sup> grade MEAP math went up 2.3% and 7 <sup>th</sup> grade reading also was up 2.3%; 8 <sup>th</sup> grade science up 2%	From 97-98 to 98-99, 4 <sup>th</sup> grade math down 6.1%, reading down 7.2%; 5 <sup>th</sup> grade science and writing declined, as did 8 <sup>th</sup> grade writing
Baltimore, MD (1998)	California Test of Basic Skills/4 (CTBS/4)	From 97-98 to 98-99, improvements in grades 1 and 2 on reading portion of CTBS/4	From 97-98 to 98-99, no improvement in other grades on reading CTBS/4 and no improvement in any grade in math portion of CTBS/4
Washington D.C. (2000)	Stanford 9 (% of students scoring at basic or above)	From 96-97 to 98-99, 13% gain in math grades 2,4 & reading grade 8; 5+% gain in math grades 3,5,6,8 & reading grades 3,6,10	From 96-97 to 98-99, no gain in math grades 1,10; from 97-98 to 98-99, negative change in math grades 1,6,10,11 & reading grades 1,6
Oakland, CA (2000) Harrisburg, PA (2000) <b>Group 2: State Control</b> Jersey City, NJ (1989)	Takeover Still Beginning Takeover Still Beginning New Jersey 4 <sup>th</sup> Grade Assessment, New Jersey High School Proficiency Test (HSPT)	On HSPT: %passing Writing improved by 8%	On 4 <sup>th</sup> grade test: From 96-97, %meeting state standards fell 2.9% in reading, 2.9% in math, and 2.1% in writing
Paterson, NJ (1991)	New Jersey High School Proficiency Test (HSPT)	From 97-98 to 98-99, %passing math up 9.4%; from 96-97 to 97-98, %passing reading and writing both improved (before falling in the next interval)	From 97-98 to 98-99, no HS met their benchmark and %passing in reading fell 12.2%, in writing 4.1%; before rising, math scores fell from 96-97 to 97-98
Newark, NJ (1995)	New Jersey High School Proficiency Test (HSPT)	From 97-98 to 98-99, %passing improved 2.7% in writing	From 97-98 to 98-99, %passing declined 10.5% in reading and 1% in writing
Compton, CA (1993)	Stanford 9	From 98-99 to 99-00, reading scores went up by more than 10% in grades 3,5,7; language scores also up in grades 3,5,7	District performance, even in 99-00, however, was considerably lower than state averages.
Hartford, CT (1997)	Connecticut Mastery Test (CMT), Connecticut	From 97-98 to 98-99, made double-digit gains in both	On the CAPT, only small gains in district from 1995

	<i>Standardized Tests Analyzed</i>	<i>Evidence to Suggest Improvement</i>	<i>Evidence to Suggest Stagnation or Decline</i>
Lawrence, MA (1999)	Academic Performance Test (CAPT)  Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)	reading and math CMT scores  From 98-99, some small gains in the bottom 20% of elementary schools on MCAS	to 1998, and no gains in the science component  From 98-99, %failing the MCAS grew in both English and Math

**NOTES ON TABLE 3:** This table offers a quick comparison between districts based on their recent improvements (or non-improvements) in student achievement. It is not an exhaustive list of all changes in these districts. Although most of the takeover districts test their students with more than one standardized test, in this table we focus on only one test. We note which test we focus on in the "Standardized Test Analyzed" column. Data sources: School District and State Department of Education web sites.

**Table 4. Boston City Public Schools' Change in Achievement on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) from 1997-98 to 1998-99, for Grades 4, 8, 10**

	<i>English</i>		<i>Math</i>	
	<b>%Proficient or above</b> (Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)	<b>%Failing</b> (Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)	<b>%Proficient or above</b> (Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)	<b>%Failing</b> (Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)
<b>Fourth Grade</b>				
All schools	2.09%	-7.80%	5.66%	-10.25%
Bottom 20% Schools	4.05%	-16.43%	8.96%	-14.00%
<b>Eighth Grade</b>				
All schools	3.28%	-5.08%	2.48%	-9.88%
Bottom 20% Schools	4.57%	-10.71%	0.33%	-10.00%
<b>Tenth Grade</b>				
All schools	-0.78%	-1.94%	2.44%	-3.06%
Bottom 20% Schools	-1.75%	-1.75%	0.50%	-3.75%

**NOTES FOR TABLE 4:** MCAS classifies students in one of five categories: Advanced Level, Proficient, Needs Improvement, Failing (tested) and Failing (absent). Here, "%Proficient or Above" includes those students who are either advanced or proficient, and "% Failing" includes both those who failed due to testing and those who failed due to absence. These figures are for "Regular Students," which includes those students who are not identified as "Disabled" or "Limited English Proficiency." Bottom 20% Schools are those schools who performed in the lowest 20% on the 1997-98 MCAS (the first year of the testing.) Lowest performing schools were determined separately for math and English (i.e. the "bottom 20% of math schools" may be different from the "bottom 20% of English schools.") Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education.

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**Table 5. Chicago Public Schools' Change in Achievement on Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS, Gr. 3-8) and Tests of Achievement and Proficiency (TAP, Gr. 9 & 11), 93-94 to 96-97 & 96-97 to 98-99**

	Percent of students at or above national norms			
	<u>Change from 1993-94 to 1996-97</u>		<u>Change from 1996-97 to 1998-99</u>	
	Math	Reading	Math	Reading
<i>District Total</i>				
All Grades Tested	7.8%	3.6%	9.0%	6.6%
Bottom 20%	12.7%	7.2%	15.5%	9.3%
<i>Grade 4</i>				
All schools	7.8%	3.1%	12.5%	10.9%
Bottom 20%	12.2%	7.6%	19.4%	16.1%
<i>Grade 8</i>				
All schools	13.5%	3.0%	10.0%	7.5%
Bottom 20%	14.7%	9.6%	16.0%	13.8%
<i>Grade 11</i>				
All schools	9.1%	3.8%	7.3%	5.0%
Bottom 20%	8.5%	4.3%	9.0%	5.9%

**NOTES FOR TABLE 5:** "Bottom 20%" schools were determined by taking the lowest performing schools at each grade level and in each subject area from the base year. For example, the sub-group, "Bottom 20% of fourth graders" in the first column represents the set of fourth graders at the schools that performed the poorest in 1994 (the base year for comparison to the 1996-97 school year.) The results presented here include all schools tested in each of the two comparison testing years. Results from all grades are similar to grades 4, 8, and 11 shown here.. Data Source: Chicago Public Schools web site: <http://cps.k12.il.us>.

**Table 6. Lawrence Public Schools' Change in Achievement from 1997-98 to 1998-99 on the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)**

	<i>English</i>		<i>Math</i>	
	%Proficient or above	%Failing	%Proficient or above	%Failing
	(Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)	(Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)	(Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)	(Change from 1997-98 to 1998-99)
<i>All grades</i>				
All schools	-0.1%	2.6%	-0.4%	0.6%
<i>4th grade</i>				
All schools	1.5%	5.3%	1.1%	-1.8%
Bottom 20%	2.3%	4.5%	1.0%	-11.3%
<i>8<sup>th</sup> grade</i>				
All schools	-3.7%	-1.7%	-3.3%	4.1%
Bottom 20%	0.5%	-1.5%	1.5%	-1.5%
<i>10<sup>th</sup> grade</i>				
All schools	3.0%	-2.0%	0.0%	7.0%

**NOTES FOR TABLE 6:** See Table 4 notes for MCAS classifications. Lowest performing schools were determined separately for math and English (i.e. the "bottom 20% of math schools" may be different from the "bottom 20% of English schools." For the 4<sup>th</sup> grade data, the "Bottom 20%" represents the lowest 4 (of 13) performing schools. Data source: Massachusetts Dept. of Education

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**Table 7. Compton Public Schools' Change in Achievement from 1997-98 to 1999-00 on the Stanford-9, as part of California's Standardized Testing And Reporting (STAR) Program**

	<i>Reading</i>	<i>Math</i>
	<i>% (percent of students) scoring at or above the 50th National Percentile</i>	<i>% (percent of students) scoring at or above the 50th National Percentile</i>
<i>District Total</i>		
All Grades Tested	4.3%	6.5%
Bottom 20%	6.5%	7.9%
<i>Grade 4</i>		
All schools	1.7%	6.1%
Bottom 20%	11.0%	9.3%
<i>Grade 8</i>		
All schools	2.1%	3.0%
Bottom 20%	6.5%	6.0%
<i>Grade 11</i>		
All schools	3.3%	3.3%
Bottom 20%	0.0%	-2.5%

**NOTES FOR TABLE 7:** For grades 6, 7, and 8 the "Bottom 20%" are only the bottom 2 (of 8) schools. There is no "Bottom 20%" reported for grade 9 and grade 10 because there are too few schools. In grade 11, the "Bottom 20%" represents the lowest 2 (of 6) schools. The grades shown here are representative of the whole. Data source: California Department of Education, STAR Reports 1998 and 2000.

**Table 8. Mayoral and State Takeover Districts Current Per Pupil Expenditures (Constant 1997 \$) and Percent of Expenditures Spent on Instruction and Support, 1991-1997**

	<i>Academic Year</i>					
	<i>1991-92</i>	<i>1992-93</i>	<i>1993-94</i>	<i>1994-95</i>	<i>1995-96</i>	<i>1996-97</i>
<i>National Averages</i>						
Per Pupil Expenditures (PPE)	\$6,205	\$6,206	\$6,247	\$6,311	\$6,288	\$6,392
Change in PPE		0.0%	0.7%	1.0%	-0.4%	1.6%
<i>Mayoral Averages</i>						
Per Pupil Expenditures (PPE)	\$7,024	\$7,266	\$7,239	\$7,296	\$7,257	\$7,148
Change in PPE		3.9%	-0.5%	0.5%	4.6%	0.8%
% Spent on Instruction	58.6%	59.4%	57.6%	57.0%	60.6%	62.4%
% Spent on Support	37.0%	36.2%	34.0%	32.6%	35.5%	33.6%
<i>State Takeover Averages</i>						
Per Pupil Expenditures (PPE)	\$7,544	\$8,507	\$8,591	\$8,693	\$8,802	\$8,900
Change in PPE		11.5%	4.7%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%
% Spent on Instruction	61.8%	61.7%	57.1%	55.1%	61.6%	63.6%
% Spent on Support	34.2%	34.5%	30.4%	29.7%	34.6%	32.3%

**NOTES FOR TABLES 8:** We have adjusted the PPE figure for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) annual averages, but we have not adjusted for regional inflation nor cost-of-living differences. PPE represents the current expenditures per student, and the "% Spent on Instruction, Support" represent the % of current expenditures spent in those areas, respectively. Data sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Elementary-Secondary School System Finance Data Files, utilizing Form F-33; NCES Common Core of Data, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

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**Table 9. Change in Distribution of Non-Teacher Administration vs. Non-Teacher Support Staff in Mayoral and State Takeover Districts, 1992-98**

<i>Mayoral Takeovers</i>	<i>Academic Year</i>					
	<i>1992-93</i>	<i>1993-94</i>	<i>1994-95</i>	<i>1995-96</i>	<i>1996-97</i>	<i>1997-98</i>
<i>Chicago</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	8.1%	8.5%	9.3%	9.4%	47.6%	48.2%
% Non-Teacher Support	61.0%	59.0%	57.3%	55.0%	23.7%	24.2%
<i>Boston</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	5.7%	5.4%	5.1%	4.3%	4.0%	4.1%
% Non-Teacher Support	68.5%	70.2%	69.8%	70.9%	71.1%	70.0%
<i>Detroit</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.		13.7%	10.8%	10.8%	8.6%	9.1%
% Non-Teacher Support		76.6%	68.2%	83.8%	78.1%	76.2%
<i>Cleveland</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	5.5%	5.2%	7.2%	9.5%	9.5%	9.7%
% Non-Teacher Support	79.9%	76.3%	77.8%	75.6%	72.8%	72.7%
<i>Oakland</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	7.5%	7.9%	53.3%	8.1%	10.2%	7.8%
% Non-Teacher Support	68.3%	67.2%	26.7%	67.2%	68.6%	69.1%
<i>Baltimore</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	11.5%	13.4%	14.0%	15.9%	16.6%	20.2%
% Non-Teacher Support	61.9%	51.9%	53.9%	46.0%	51.5%	55.0%
<i>Washington DC</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.		21.3%	20.6%	20.7%	19.2%	9.5%
% Non-Teacher Support		61.0%	61.3%	62.5%	59.4%	74.2%
<b><i>State Takeovers</i></b>	<b><i>1992-93</i></b>	<b><i>1993-94</i></b>	<b><i>1994-95</i></b>	<b><i>1995-96</i></b>	<b><i>1996-97</i></b>	<b><i>1997-98</i></b>
<i>Jersey City</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	10.3%	9.0%	9.6%	9.6%	8.8%	8.8%
% Non-Teacher Support	60.0%	63.5%	65.0%	64.9%	66.1%	64.7%
<i>Paterson</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	11.4%	9.0%	9.5%	8.4%	9.4%	10.5%
% Non-Teacher Support	60.6%	69.7%	68.2%	71.4%	63.1%	57.5%
<i>Newark</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	10.1%	10.7%	9.6%	9.7%	10.2%	9.5%
% Non-Teacher Support	67.7%	69.8%	68.5%	69.7%	67.9%	69.3%
<i>Compton</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	4.6%	7.6%	64.8%	10.1%	11.0%	9.9%
% Non-Teacher Support	61.8%	63.3%	15.9%	57.4%	56.4%	66.1%
<i>Lawrence</i>						
% Non-Teacher Adms.	11.5%	8.3%	5.9%	11.0%	3.4%	2.6%
% Non-Teacher Support	48.2%	44.0%	50.2%	46.7%	67.7%	60.8%

**NOTES ON TABLES 9:** Data source: NCES Common Core of Data (CCD). Figures from Harrisburg, PA and Hartford, CT were similar to those shown. "% Administrators" represents the percent of all non-teacher employees who are listed in CCD as "LEA administrators, School administrators, or Coordinators/Supervisors." "% Support Staff" represents the percent of all non-teacher employees who are listed as Support Staff (Library support, LEA support, School administration support, Student support, and Other support). Change % represent the change from the previous academic year.

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**Table 10. State and Local Standardized Tests in Takeover Districts**

	State Assessment?	Name(s) of State Assessment	Additional Tests?	Name(s) of Additional Tests
<b>Mayoral Takeovers</b>				
Boston	Yes	Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)	Yes	Stanford 9 (SAT-9)
Chicago	Yes	Illinois Goals Assessment Program (IGAP); Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT)	Yes	Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS), Chicago Academic Standards Examinations (CASE)
Detroit	Yes	Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP)	Yes	Metropolitan Achievement Test (MAT)
Cleveland	Yes	Ohio State Proficiency Test (OSPT)	Yes	Stanford 9 (SAT-9)
Baltimore	Yes	Maryland School Performance Assessment Program (MSPAP)	Yes	Curriculum Based Assessment, Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills/4 (CTBS/4)
Oakland	Yes	California Achievement Test (CAT)	Yes	Stanford 9 (SAT-9)
Washington DC	-	-	Yes	Stanford 9 (SAT-9)
<b>State Takeovers</b>				
Harrisburg	Yes	Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA)	Yes	
Paterson	Yes	Elementary/Eighth Grade/High School School Proficiency Assessment (ESPA, GEPA, HSPT)	Yes	Stanford 9 (SAT-9), Local Assessment
Hartford	Yes	Connecticut Mastery Test (CMT)	Yes	
Compton	Yes	California Achievement Test (CAT)	Yes	Stanford 9 (SAT-9)

**Notes**

<sup>1</sup> Kansas City Star. "Embattled Kansas City Schools Chief Resigns." May 2, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> St. Louis Post-Dispatch. "Most candidates say they would take over schools if they fail." February 28, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion and brief analysis, see "Racial Issues Cloud State Takeovers," *Education Week*, January 14, 1998. Available on-line at: <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/18minor.h17>. More recently in Kansas City, MO, see also, "African-American group opposes school district takeover," *Kansas City Star*, March 2, 2001.

<sup>4</sup> United States Department of Education. "No Child Left Behind."

<sup>5</sup> For discussion of the one completed comprehensive state takeover, in Logan County, WV, see "W.Va. Leaves District Better Than It Found It" (1996) in *Education Week*, <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1996/03wva.h16>, "W.Va. Board Assumes Control of District for 1st Time," September 9, 1992, <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1992/01-1wva.h12>, Ziebarth (2001) and Seder (2000). The West Virginia Department of Education also publishes detailed district Report Cards, available at: [http://wvde.state.wv.us/data/report\\_cards/](http://wvde.state.wv.us/data/report_cards/). A current picture of Logan County can also be found on the website: West Virginia Board of Education (2000). *Final Education Finance Audit Report for Logan County Schools*, September 2000. Available on-line at: <http://wvde.state.wv.us/>.

<sup>6</sup> Ziebarth (2001).

<sup>7</sup> In a study for the Reason Public Policy Institute, Seder (2000) examines a sample of takeovers and finds that "from a financial-management standpoint, most of the different intervention strategies tend to be successful ... however, these intervention strategies have not consistently turned around academic results."

<sup>8</sup> Bushweller (1998).

<sup>9</sup> *Education Week*, May 31, 2000. "N.J.. Takeover of Newark found to yield gains, but lack clear goals."

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<sup>10</sup> *Education Week*, "N.J. Plans to End Takeover in Jersey City," June 9, 1999.

<sup>11</sup> In some of these "in progress" takeovers, the takeover reform is still quite new (less than 2 years old) and in these cases our analyses are limited due to a lack of data. This applies most to Harrisburg, PA and Oakland, CA.

<sup>12</sup> Although there are many variations in how takeover reform has been implemented in different school districts, this variation does not prevent us from answering the first type of question. Rather, it is only after we have a strong set of measured outcomes for each school district that the variations become meaningful. Before we can identify the factors that produce successful takeover reform, we must first establish which takeovers have been successful and which have not.

<sup>13</sup> See Authors (2000) for a detailed description of each district.

<sup>14</sup> An additional reason for selecting these districts first was availability of data for analysis. As we extend our research, we will conduct school level analysis in all of our case study districts. We will also conduct more detailed analysis, incorporating socio-demographic controls. The results presented in this paper suggest that this future analysis may produce very interesting findings.

<sup>15</sup> Our most recent staffing data is from the 1998-99 school year, so the effects from the most recent takeovers on staffing could not be determined. We also looked at student-teacher ratios over time, but did not find significant variations in relation to the mayoral and state takeovers.

<sup>16</sup> NCES classifies the number of full time employees (FTE) serving in various categories in the district. There are eleven categories beyond teachers: "Aides, Coordinators/Supervisors, Guidance counselors, Library/media, Library/media support, LEA administration, LEA support staff, School administrators, School admin support staff, Student support service staff, and All other support staff." Of these eleven categories, we "% Administrators" represents the percent of all non-teacher employees who are listed in CCD as "LEA administrators, School administrators, or Coordinators/Supervisors." "% Support Staff" represents the percent of all non-teacher employees who are listed as Support Staff (Library support, LEA support, School administration support, Student support, and Other support).

<sup>17</sup> The NCES data also allowed us to consider ratios of: "Student/teacher, Administrator/teacher, Teacher/Non-teacher, Administrator/Student, and Support/Student," but we did not find significant variations across time in these measurements.

<sup>18</sup> Public Agenda (2000). "National Poll of Parents of Public School Students," Press Release on October 5, 2000. Available on-line at: <http://www.publicagenda.org>.


<sup>19</sup> This comparison should not be interpreted as a negative comment about the rest of Boston's public schools (outside the bottom 20%). It is likely that the reason the other 80% of schools have a smaller *change* in %failing because they had fewer failing students to begin with. This comparison is used to isolate the lowest performing schools to assess their progress. It is not a given that the bottom 20% of schools will improve, and that is why the comparison is necessary. It is conceivable, for instance, that the bottom 20% of schools could have seen little change while other schools in the district contributed to a large change in the district average.

<sup>20</sup> Using testing calendars made available by each school district, we calculated the total number of standardized tests administered per year in each district for all grades. For example, in Chicago during the academic year there are a total of 22 tests given across all grades. In grades 3-5 and 7-8 students take 2 tests per year. In grade 6 they take 1 test per year. In grades 9-11 they take 3 tests and in grade 12 they take 2 tests per year. We made similar calculations for each of the takeover districts.

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